(Ebook PDF) Conditionals Paradox and Probability Themes from the Philosophy of Dorothy Edgington 1st edition by Lee Walters,John Hawthorne ISBN 9780191021343 0191021342 full chapters

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ISBN 10: 0191021342

ISBN 13: 9780191021343

Author: Lee Walters,, John Hawthorne,

Table of Contents:

• Chapter 1: Introduction
• 1.1 Conditionals
• 1.2 The Paradox of Vagueness
• 1.3 The Paradox of Knowability
• References
• Chapter 2: Philosophy and Me
• Chapter 3: A Note on Conditionals and Restrictors
• 3.1 Introduction
• 3.2 Conditionals and Semantic Theory
• 3.3 Conditionals and Adverbs of Quantification
• 3.4 Uniformity
• 3.5 Restrictor-based Theories
• 3.6 Strict Conditional
• 3.7 Material Conditional
• 3.8 Stalnaker/Lewis Conditionals
• 3.9 Non-propositional
• 3.10 Trivalent
• 3.11 Non-propositional Modals
• 3.12 Conditional Commands
• 3.13 The Argument from Probability and Restrictors
• 3.14 Embedded Conditionals
• 3.15 Conclusion
• Appendix 3.1 Restrictor Semantics
• Appendix 3.2 Non-propositional Modal Restrictor Semantics
• References
• Chapter 4: Chasing Hook: Quantified Indicative Conditionals
• 4.1 Higginbotham’s Puzzle
• 4.2 Abbott’s Puzzle
• 4.3 Pizzi and Williamson’s Bombshell
• 4.4 Solving Abbott’s Puzzle: Hook in Hiding
• 4.5 The Family of Hook
• 4.6 Outlook
• References
• Chapter 5: New Paradigm Psychology of Conditional Reasoning and Its Philosophical Sources
• 5.1 The Equation and the de Finetti Table
• 5.2 Extending the de Finetti Table and the Ramsey Test
• 5.3 Valid Inferences in the New Paradigm
• 5.4 Belief Revision and Updating
• 5.5 Conclusion
• References
• Chapter 6: Counterfactuals to the Rescue
• 6.1 Introduction
• 6.2 Polarity Reversal in Counterfactuals
• 6.3 Scalar Assertions
• 6.4 Already, Still: Content, Presupposition and Alternatives
• 6.5 Counterfactuals and Alternatives
• 6.51 The semantics of counterfactuals and presuppositional antecedents
• 6.5.2 Antecedents with positive polarity
• 6.5.3 Antecedents with polarity reversal
• 6.5.4 The role of counterfactuality
• 6.5.5 Indicative conditionals
• 6.5.6 Polarity reversal and types of conditionals
• References
• Chapter 7: Counterfactuals and Probability
• 7.1 Introduction
• 7.2 Expressivism about Indicative Conditionals and Epistemic Modals
• 7.3 From More Fragile to More Robust Conditionals
• 7.4 Retrospective Assessment
• 7.5 Chance and Counterfactuals
• Appendix
• References
• Chapter 8: Grammar Matters
• 8.1 What’s in a Name?
• 8.2 If It Is Not the Subjunctive, then What Is It?
• 8.3 The Mark of Then
• 8.4 There Is No Magic in if
• 8.5 And, There Is No Special Status to if p, q
• 8.6 Conclusion
• References
• Chapter 9: Constructing the Impossible
• 9.1 Truthmaker Semantics with Possible States
• 9.2 The Construction
• 9.3 Advantages of the Construction
• 9.4 Applications
• 9.5 Modal Completion
• Formal Appendix
• Preliminaries
• Completions
• Uniqueness
• Factoring
• Semantics
• References
• Chapter 10: The Epistemic Use of ‘Ought’
• 10.1 Proposal One
• 10.2 Proposal Two
• 10.3 Proposal Three
• 10.4 Proposal Four
• 10.5 Proposal Five
• References
• Chapter 11: Undercutting Defeat and Edgington’s Burglar
• 11.1 Game Plan
• 11.2 Reasons and Defeaters
• The Polling Case
• The Visual Case
• 11.3 Combining Things
• 11.4 Counter-examples to Orthodoxy about Undercutting Defeaters
• The Milk Taster
• The Not-Because-Presupposer
• The Not-Subjunctive-Presupposer
• The Mixed-up Assessor
• 115 Edgington’s Burglar: Some Notation
• 11.6 Higher-order Mental States and Undercutting Defeat
• References
• Chapter 12: Edgington on Possible Knowledge of Unknown Truth
• 12.1 Introduction
• 12.2 Clarification of E-Knowability
• 12.3 Underlying Motivation for Edgington’s Strategy of Reformulating Knowability
• 12.4 Edgington’s General View of Counterfactual Conditionals and Her Use of Them in Defence of Her
• 12.5 Conclusion
• References
• Chapter 13: Prefaces, Sorites, and Guides to Reasoning
• 13.1 An Analogy
• 13.2 Degrees of Belief and the Preface
• 13.3 Degree-Theoretic Accounts of Vagueness: Edgington’s Option
• 13.4 Non-probabilistic Alternatives and the Scare Story Again
• 13.5 Supervaluationism: A Better Guide to Reasoning?
• 13.6 Conclusion
• References
• Chapter 14: Hysteresis Hypotheses
• 14.1 A Sorites Experiment
• 14.2 The Progressive Preface Paradox
• 14.3 The Lockean Thesis
• 14.4 The Rationality of Reverse Hysteresis in Our Original Sorites Experiment
• 14.5 The Rationality of Reverse Hysteresis in the Progressive Preface Paradox
• References
• Chapter 15: Verities and Truth-values
• 15.1 Edgington’s Proposal
• 15.1.1 The framework
• 15.1.2 Validity
• 15.1.3 The sorites
• 15.2 Verities as Truth-Values
• 15.2.1 Edgington on degrees of truth
• 15.2.2 Two ways of classifying what?
• 15.2.3 Against Classification
• The Closure Argument
• The T-Implication Argument
• 15.3 Vagueness as Sui Generis?
• 15.3.1 Bivalence at the border
• 15.3.2 Two roles for truth

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Conditionals,Paradox,Probability,Dorothy Edgington