Engineering Trustworthy Systems Get Cybersecurity Design Right the First Time 1st Edition by Sami Saydjari 1260118185 9781260118186

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ISBN-10 :  1260118185 

ISBN-13 :  9781260118186

Author : O Sami Saydjari 

Cutting-edge cybersecurity solutions to defend against the most sophisticated attacks This professional guide shows, step by step, how to design and deploy highly secure systems on time and within budget. The book offers comprehensive examples, objectives, and best practices and shows how to build and maintain powerful, cost-effective cybersecurity systems. Readers will learn to think strategically, identify the highest priority risks, and apply advanced countermeasures that address the entire attack space. Engineering Trustworthy Systems: Get Cybersecurity Design Right the First Time showcases 35 years of practical engineering experience from an expert whose persuasive vision has advanced national cybersecurity policy and practices. Readers of this book will be prepared to navigate the tumultuous and uncertain future of cyberspace and move the cybersecurity discipline forward by adopting timeless engineering principles, including: •Defining the fundamental nature and full breadth of the cybersecurity problem •Adopting an essential perspective that considers attacks, failures, and attacker mindsets •Developing and implementing risk-mitigating, systems-based solutions •Transforming sound cybersecurity principles into effective architecture and evaluation strategies that holistically address the entire complex attack space

Engineering Trustworthy Systems: Get Cybersecurity Design Right the First Time 1st Table of contents:

Part I What Do You Want?
Chapter 1 What’s the Problem?
Overview
Learning Objectives
1.1 Baking in Trustworthiness: Design-Time
1.1.1 What Is Trust?
1.1.2 Trust and Belief
1.1.3 Engineering
1.1.4 Why Trust?
1.2 Operational Perspective: Basic Questions
1.2.1 Am I Under Attack?
1.2.2 What Is the Nature of the Attack?
1.2.3 What Is the Mission Impact So Far?
1.2.4 What Is the Potential Mission Impact?
1.2.5 When Did It Start?
1.2.6 Who Is Attacking?
1.2.7 What Are They Trying to Do?
1.2.8 What Is the Attacker’s Next Step?
1.2.9 What Can I Do About It?
1.2.10 What Are My Options and How Effective Will Each Option Be?
1.2.11 How Will My Mitigation Actions Affect Operation?
1.2.12 How Do I Better Defend Myself in the Future?
1.3 Asymmetry of Cyberspace Effects
1.3.1 Dimensionality
1.3.2 Nonlinearity
1.3.3 Coupling
1.3.4 Velocity
1.3.5 Manifestation
1.3.6 Detectability
1.4 The Cybersecurity Solution Landscape
1.4.1 Information Assurance Science and Engineering
1.4.2 Defensive Mechanisms
1.4.3 Cybersensors and Exploitation
1.4.4 Cyber Situation Understanding
1.4.5 Cyber Actuation
1.4.6 Cyber Command and Control
1.4.7 Cyber Defense Strategy and Tactics
1.5 Ounces of Prevention and Pounds of Cure
Conclusion
Questions
Chapter 2 Cybersecurity Right-Think
Overview
Learning Objectives
2.1 It’s About Risk
2.2 The Cybersecurity Trade-off: Performance and Functionality
2.2.1 User-Friendliness
2.2.2 Time to Market
2.2.3 Employee Morale
2.2.4 Missed Opportunity
2.2.5 Opportunity Cost
2.2.6 Quantity of Service or Product
2.2.7 Quality of Service or Product
2.2.8 Cost of Service or Product
2.2.9 Limited Resources
2.3 Theories of Security Come from Theories of Insecurity
2.4 They Come at You Through the Weeds
2.5 Top-Down Meets Bottom-Up
2.6 Cybersecurity Is a Live Orchestra, Not a Recorded Instrument
Conclusion
Questions
Chapter 3 Value and Mission: Know Thyself
Overview
Learning Objectives
3.1 Focus on Mission and Value
3.1.1 Avoid Concentrating Value
3.1.2 Beware the Complacency of Trust
3.2 Confidentiality: Value of Secrecy from Adversaries
3.2.1 Acquired-Knowledge Secrets
3.2.2 Planning Secrets
3.2.3 Stolen Secrets
3.2.4 Means-of-Stealing-Secrets Secrets
3.3 Confidentiality: Beware the Tyranny of Secrecy
3.3.1 Secrecy Is Tenuous
3.3.2 Secrecy Is Expensive
3.3.3 Secrecy Can Be Self-Defeating
3.3.4 Secrecy Is Self-Breeding
3.3.5 Secrecy Creates a Form of Corrupting Power and Impediment to Operation
3.4 Confidentiality: Changing the Value Proposition
3.4.1 Minimize Secrecy and Dependency on Secrecy
3.4.2 Minimize Impact of Loss of Secrecy
3.5 Integrity: The Root of All Trustworthiness Value
3.6 Availability: An Essential Yet Tenuous Value
Conclusion
Questions
Chapter 4 Harm: Mission in Peril
Overview
Learning Objectives
4.1 Focus on Strategic Risks
4.1.1 What Is Strategic Risk?
4.1.2 Expected Harm
4.1.3 The Range of Risks
4.1.4 The Meaning of Focus
4.2 Harm Is About Mission
4.2.1 Elicitation of Harm
4.2.2 Aggregating Harm Statements
4.2.3 Representative Harm Lists
4.3 Critical Asset Inventory: Data
4.3.1 Data Asset Types
4.3.2 Data Value Spectrum
4.3.3 Criticality Classes
4.3.4 Criticality Levels
4.4 A Template for Exploring Mission Harm
4.5 Harm Is in the Eye of the Beholder
4.5.1 Gravity of Harm: Consensus
4.5.2 Drawing Conclusions
4.6 Sometimes Belief Is More Powerful than Truth
4.6.1 Destroying Value
4.6.2 Frustrating to Address: Life Is Unfair
Conclusion
Questions
Chapter 5 Approximating Reality
Overview
Learning Objectives
5.1 The Complexity of State: Why Model?
5.2 Levels of Abstraction: At What Levels
5.3 What to Model and Why
5.3.1 The Target System
5.3.2 Users
5.3.3 Adversaries
5.3.4 Measures/Countermeasures
5.4 Models Are Always Wrong, Sometimes Useful
5.4.1 Incompleteness of Essentials
5.4.2 Inaccuracy
5.4.3 Non-Timeliness
5.5 Model Views
5.5.1 Defender’s View
5.5.2 Adversary’s View
5.5.3 Attacking the Views Themselves
5.6 Defense Models Must Consider Failure Modes
5.7 Assume Adversaries Know Defender’s System
5.8 Assume Adversaries Are Inside Defender’s System
Conclusion
Questions
Part II What Could Go Wrong?
Chapter 6 Adversaries: Know Thy Enemy
Overview
Learning Objectives
6.1 Know Your Adversaries
6.1.1 Intentions
6.1.2 Capabilities
6.1.3 Attacker Resources and Defender Resources
6.1.4 Risk Tolerance
6.1.5 Strategic Goals
6.1.6 Tactics
6.2 Assume Smart Adversaries
6.3 Assume Adversaries Don’t Play Fair
6.3.1 Going Around Security Controls
6.3.2 Going Beneath Security Controls
6.3.3 Attacking the Weakest Link
6.3.4 Violating a Design Assumption
6.3.5 Using Maintenance Modes
6.3.6 Using Social Engineering
6.3.7 Using Bribery and Blackmail to Subvert Insiders
6.3.8 Taking Advantage of Temporary Bypasses
6.3.9 Taking Advantage of Temporary Connections
6.3.10 Taking Advantage of Natural System Failure
6.3.11 Exploiting Bugs You Did Not Even Know You Had
6.3.12 Compromising External Systems that a System Trusts
6.4 Anticipate Attack Escalation
6.5 Red Teams
6.5.1 Opposing Force
6.5.2 Red Team Characteristics
6.5.3 Other Types of Red Teams
6.6 Cyberspace Exercises
6.6.1 Red Versus Blue
6.6.2 Pure Versus Hybrid
6.6.3 Purple Collaboration
6.7 Red Team Work Factor: Measuring Difficulty
Conclusion
Questions
Chapter 7 Forests of Attack Trees
Overview
Learning Objectives
7.1 Attack Trees and Forests
7.1.1 Attack Tree Structure
7.1.2 Deriving Attack Scenarios
7.1.3 From Trees to Forests
7.2 System Failures Predict Cybersecurity Failures
7.2.1 Inspirational Catastrophes
7.2.2 The 10x Rule
7.2.3 Feigning Failure
7.3 Understanding Failure Is the Key to Success: The Five Whys
7.3.1 Why Five Whys?
7.3.2 Projecting Fishbones
7.4 Forests Should Be Representative, Not Exhaustive
7.5 Drive Each Attack Tree Layer by Asking How
7.6 Go as Deep as Needed and No Deeper
7.7 Beware of External Dependencies
7.7.1 Just in Time
7.7.2 Information Dependency
7.7.3 Creating Redundancy
Conclusion
Questions
Part III What Are the Building Blocks of Mitigating Risk?
Chapter 8 Countermeasures: Security Controls
Overview
Learning Objectives
8.1 Countermeasures: Design to Purpose
8.2 Ensure Attack-Space Coverage (Defense in Breadth)
8.3 Defense in Depth and Breadth
8.4 Multilevel Security, Trusted Code, Security Kernels
8.4.1 Multilevel Security
8.4.2 Trusted Code
8.4.3 Security Kernel and the Reference Monitor
8.5 Integrity and Type Enforcement
8.5.1 Multilevel Integrity
8.5.2 Type Enforcement
8.6 Cybersecurity Usability
8.6.1 Invisible
8.6.2 Transparent
8.6.3 Clear
8.6.4 Easy to Understand
8.6.5 Reliable
8.6.6 Fast
8.6.7 Reversible
8.6.8 Adaptable
8.6.9 Traceable
8.6.10 Reviewable
8.7 Deploy Default Secure
8.8 Costs
8.8.1 Cost Always Matters
8.8.2 Time-to-Deploy Matters
8.8.3 Impact to Mission Matters
8.8.4 Pareto Rule: 80/20
8.8.5 Opportunity Cost Is a Key Part of Cost
8.8.6 How Much to Invest in Cybersecurity
8.8.7 Optimizing Zero-Sum Cybersecurity Budgets
Conclusion
Questions
Chapter 9 Trustworthy Hardware: Bedrock
Overview
Learning Objectives
9.1 Foundation of Trust
9.2 Instruction Set Architectures
9.3 Supervisors with Rings and Things
9.4 Controlling Memory: Mapping, Capabilities, and Tagging
9.4.1 Memory Mapping
9.4.2 Capabilities
9.4.3 Tagging
9.5 Software in Hardware
9.5.1 Microcode
9.5.2 Firmware
9.5.3 Secure Bootstrapping
9.6 Buses and Controllers
Conclusion
Questions
Chapter 10 Cryptography: A Sharp and Fragile Tool
Overview
Learning Objectives
10.1 What Is Cryptography?
10.2 Key Space
10.3 Key Generation
10.4 Key Distribution
10.4.1 Transmission to Intended Recipients
10.4.2 Storage
10.4.3 Loading
10.5 Public-Key Cryptography
10.5.1 The Math
10.5.2 Certificates and Certificate Authorities
10.5.3 Performance and Use
10.5.4 Side Effect of Public-Key Cryptography
10.6 Integrity
10.7 Availability
10.7.1 Positive Effects
10.7.2 Negative Effects
10.8 Chinks in the Cryptographic Armor
10.8.1 Quantum Cryptanalytics: Disruptive Technology
10.8.2 P=NP
10.9 Cryptography Is Not a Panacea
10.10 Beware of Homegrown Cryptography
Conclusion
Questions
Chapter 11 Authentication
Overview
Learning Objectives
11.1 Entity Identification: Phase 1 of Authentication
11.2 Identity Certification: Phase 2 of Authentication
11.3 Identity Resolution: Phase 3 of Authentication
11.4 Identity Assertion and Identity Proving: Phases 4 and 5 of Authentication
11.5 Identity Decertification: Phase 6 of Authentication
11.6 Machine-to-Machine Authentication Chaining
Conclusion
Questions
Chapter 12 Authorization
Overview
Learning Objectives
12.1 Access Control
12.1.1 Discretionary Access Control
12.1.2 Mandatory Access Control
12.1.3 Covert Channels
12.1.4 Identity-Based Access Control
12.1.5 Attribute-Based Access Control
12.2 Attribute Management
12.2.1 User Attributes and Privilege Assignment
12.2.2 Resource Attribute Assignment
12.2.3 Attribute Collection and Aggregation
12.2.4 Attribute Validation
12.2.5 Attribute Distribution
12.3 Digital Policy Management
12.3.1 Policy Specification
12.3.2 Policy Distribution
12.3.3 Policy Decision
12.3.4 Policy Enforcement
12.4 Authorization Adoption Schemas
12.4.1 Direct Integration
12.4.2 Indirect Integration
12.4.3 Alternative Integration
Conclusion
Questions
Chapter 13 Detection Foundation
Overview
Learning Objectives
13.1 The Role of Detection
13.2 How Detection Systems Work
13.3 Feature Selection
13.3.1 Attack Manifestation in Features
13.3.2 Manifestation Strength
13.3.3 Mapping Attacks to Features
13.3.4 Criteria for Selection
13.4 Feature Extraction
13.5 Event Selection
13.6 Event Detection
13.7 Attack Detection
13.8 Attack Classification
13.9 Attack Alarming
13.10 Know Operational Performance Characteristics for Sensors
Conclusion
Questions
Chapter 14 Detection Systems
Overview
Learning Objectives
14.1 Types of Detection Systems
14.1.1 Signature-Based
14.1.2 Anomaly Detection
14.2 Detection Performance: False Positives, False Negatives, and ROCs
14.2.1 Feature Selection
14.2.2 Feature Extraction
14.2.3 Event Selection
14.2.4 Attack Detection
14.2.5 Attack Classification
14.2.6 Attack Alarming
14.3 Drive Detection Requirements from Attacks
14.4 Detection Failures
14.4.1 Blind Sensors
14.4.2 Below Noise Floor
14.4.3 Below Alert Threshold
14.4.4 Improper Placement
14.4.5 Natural Failure
14.4.6 Successfully Attacked
14.4.7 Blocked Sensor Input
14.4.8 Blocked Report Output
Conclusion
Questions
Chapter 15 Detection Strategy
Overview
Learning Objectives
15.1 Detect in Depth and Breadth
15.1.1 Breadth: Network Expanse
15.1.2 Depth: Network Expanse
15.1.3 Breadth: Attack Space
15.1.4 Depth: Attack Space
15.2 Herd the Adversary to Defender’s Advantage
15.3 Attack Epidemiology
15.4 Detection Honeypots
15.5 Refining Detection
15.5.1 Running Alerts to Ground
15.5.2 Learning More About an Attack
15.6 Enhancing Attack Signal and Reducing Background Noise
15.6.1 Reducing the Noise Floor
15.6.2 Boosting Attack Signal
15.6.3 Lowering the Alert Threshold
Conclusion
Questions
Chapter 16 Deterrence and Adversarial Risk
Overview
Learning Objectives
16.1 Deterrence Requirements
16.1.1 Reliable Detection: Risk of Getting Caught
16.1.2 Reliable Attribution
16.1.3 Meaningful Consequences
16.2 All Adversaries Have Risk Thresholds
16.3 System Design Can Modulate Adversary Risk
16.3.1 Detection Probability
16.3.2 Attribution Probability
16.3.3 Consequence Capability and Probability
16.3.4 Retaliation Capability and Probability
16.3.5 Risky Behavior
16.4 Uncertainty and Deception
16.4.1 Uncertainty
16.4.2 Deception
16.5 When Detection and Deterrence Do Not Work
Conclusion
Questions
Part IV How Do You Orchestrate Cybersecurity?
Chapter 17 Cybersecurity Risk Assessment
Overview
Learning Objectives
17.1 A Case for Quantitative Risk Assessment
17.2 Risk as a Primary Metric
17.3 Why Measure?
17.3.1 Characterize
17.3.2 Evaluate
17.3.3 Predict
17.3.4 Improve
17.4 Evaluate Defenses from an Attacker’s Value Perspective
17.5 The Role of Risk Assessment and Metrics in Design
17.6 Risk Assessment Analysis Elements
17.6.1 Develop Mission Model
17.6.2 Develop System Model
17.6.3 Develop Adversary Models
17.6.4 Choose Representative Strategic Attack Goals
17.6.5 Estimate Harm Using Wisdom of Crowds
17.6.6 Estimate Probability Using Wisdom of Crowds
17.6.7 Choose Representative Subset
17.6.8 Develop Deep Attack Trees
17.6.9 Estimate Leaf Probabilities and Compute Root
17.6.10 Refine Baseline Expected Harm
17.6.11 Harvest Attack Sequence Cut Sets => Risk Source
17.6.12 Infer Attack Mitigation Candidates from Attack Sequences
17.7 Attacker Cost and Risk of Detection
17.7.1 Resources
17.7.2 Risk Tolerance
Conclusion
Questions
Chapter 18 Risk Mitigation and Optimization
Overview
Learning Objectives
18.1 Develop Candidate Mitigation Packages
18.2 Assess Cost of Mitigation Packages
18.2.1 Direct Cost
18.2.2 Mission Impact
18.3 Re-estimate Leaf Node Probabilities and Compute Root Node Probability
18.4 Optimize at Various Practical Budget Levels
18.4.1 Knapsack Algorithm
18.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
18.5 Decide Investment
18.6 Execute
Conclusion
Questions
Chapter 19 Engineering Fundamentals
Overview
Learning Objectives
19.1 Systems Engineering Principles
19.1.1 Murphy’s Law
19.1.2 Margin of Safety
19.1.3 Conservation of Energy and Risk
19.1.4 Keep It Simple, Stupid
19.1.5 Development Process
19.1.6 Incremental Development and Agility
19.2 Computer Science Principles
19.2.1 Modularity and Abstraction
19.2.2 Layering
19.2.3 Time and Space Complexity: Understanding Scalability
19.2.4 Focus on What Matters: Loops and Locality
19.2.5 Divide and Conquer and Recursion
Conclusion
Questions
Chapter 20 Architecting Cybersecurity
Overview
Learning Objectives
20.1 Reference Monitor Properties
20.1.1 Functional Correctness
20.1.2 Non-Bypassable
20.1.3 Tamperproof
20.2 Simplicity and Minimality Breed Confidence
20.3 Separation of Concerns and Evolvability
20.4 Security Policy Processing
20.4.1 Policy Specification
20.4.2 Policy Decision Making
20.4.3 Policy Enforcement
20.5 Dependability and Tolerance
20.5.1 Cybersecurity Requires Fail Safety
20.5.2 Expect Failure: Confine Damages Using Bulkheads
20.5.3 Tolerance
20.5.4 Synergize Prevention, Detect-Response, and Tolerance
20.6 Cloud Cybersecurity
Conclusion
Questions
Chapter 21 Assuring Cybersecurity: Getting It Right
Overview
Learning Objectives
21.1 Cybersecurity Functionality Without Assurance Is Insecure
21.2 Treat Cybersecurity Subsystems as Critical Systems
21.3 Formal Assurance Arguments
21.3.1 Cybersecurity Requirements
21.3.2 Formal Security Policy Model
21.3.3 Formal Top-Level Specification
21.3.4 Security-Critical Subsystem Implementation
21.4 Assurance-in-the-Large and Composition
21.4.1 Composition
21.4.2 Trustworthiness Dependencies
21.4.3 Avoiding Dependency Circularity
21.4.4 Beware of the Inputs, Outputs, and Dependencies
21.4.5 Violating Unstated Assumptions
Conclusion
Questions
Chapter 22 Cyber Situation Understanding: What’s Going On
Overview
Learning Objectives
22.1 Situation Understanding Interplay with Command and Control
22.2 Situation-Based Decision Making: The OODA Loop
22.3 Grasping the Nature of the Attack
22.3.1 What Vulnerability Is It Exploiting?
22.3.2 Which Paths Are the Attacks Using?
22.3.3 Are the Attack Paths Still Open?
22.3.4 How Can the Infiltration, Exfiltration, and Propagation Paths Be Closed?
22.4 The Implication to Mission
22.4.1 Increased Risk
22.4.2 Contingency Planning
22.4.3 Nature and Locus Guiding Defense
22.5 Assessing Attack Damages
22.6 Threat Assessment
22.7 The State of Defenses
22.7.1 Health, Stress, and Duress
22.7.2 Status
22.7.3 Configuration Maneuverability
22.7.4 Progress and Failure
22.8 Dynamic Defense Effectiveness
Conclusion
Questions
Chapter 23 Command and Control: What to Do About Attacks
Overview
Learning Objectives
23.1 The Nature of Control
23.1.1 Decision Cycle
23.1.2 Speed Considerations
23.1.3 Hybrid Control
23.2 Strategy: Acquiring Knowledge
23.2.1 Analogy
23.2.2 Direct Experience
23.2.3 Vicarious Experience
23.2.4 Simulation
23.3 Playbooks
23.3.1 Game Theory
23.3.2 Courses of Action in Advance
23.3.3 Criteria for Choosing Best Action
23.3.4 Planning Limitations
23.4 Autonomic Control
23.4.1 Control Theory
23.4.2 Role of Autonomic Control
23.4.3 Autonomic Action Palette
23.5 Meta-Strategy
23.5.1 Don’t Overreact
23.5.2 Don’t Be Predictable
23.5.3 Stay Ahead of the Attackers
Conclusion
Questions
Part V Moving Cybersecurity Forward
Chapter 24 Strategic Policy and Investment
Overview
Learning Objectives
24.1 Cyberwar: How Bad Can Bad Get?
24.1.1 Scenario
24.1.2 Call to Action
24.1.3 Barriers to Preparation Action
24.1.4 Smoking Gun
24.2 Increasing Dependency, Fragility, and the Internet of Things
24.2.1 Societal Dependency
24.2.2 Just-in-Time Everything
24.2.3 The Internet of Things
24.2.4 Propagated Weakness
24.3 Cybersecurity in the Virtual World: Virtual Economy
24.3.1 Booming Game Economy: Virtual Gold Rush
24.3.2 Digital Currency Such as Bitcoin
24.3.3 Virtual High-Value Targets
24.3.4 Start from Scratch?
24.4 Disinformation and Influence Operations: Fake News
24.4.1 What’s New?
24.4.2 Hacking Wetware
24.4.3 Polluting the Infosphere
Conclusion
Questions
Chapter 25 Thoughts on the Future of Cybersecurity
Overview
Learning Objectives
25.1 A World Without Secrecy
25.1.1 Timed Release
25.1.2 Minimize Generation
25.1.3 Zero-Secrecy Operations
25.2 Coevolution of Measures and Countermeasures
25.3 Cybersecurity Space Race and Sputnik
25.3.1 Gaining the Ultimate Low Ground
25.3.2 Stuxnet and the Cyberattack Genie
25.3.3 Georgia and Hybrid Warfare
25.3.4 Estonia and Live-Fire Experiments
25.3.5 Responsibility for Defending Critical Information Infrastructure
25.4 Cybersecurity Science and Experimentation
25.4.1 Hypothesis Generation
25.4.2 Experimental Design
25.4.3 Experiment Execution
25.5 The Great Unknown: Research Directions
25.5.1 Hard Research Problems
25.5.2 Are Cybersecurity Problems Too Hard?
25.5.3 Research Impact and the Heilmeier Catechism
25.5.4 Research Results Dependability
25.5.5 Research Culture: A Warning
25.6 Cybersecurity and Artificial Intelligence
Conclusion
Questions
Part VI Appendix and Glossary
Appendix Resources

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