(EBook PDF) Strategic Justice Convention And Problems Of Balancing Divergent Interests 1st edition by Peter Vanderschraaf 0190660465 9780190660468 full chapters

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ISBN-10 :  0190660465 

ISBN-13 :  9780190660468 

Author:  Peter Vanderschraaf 

In Strategic Justice, Peter Vanderschraaf argues that justice can be properly understood as a body of special social conventions. The idea that justice is at bottom conventional has ancient roots, but has never been central in philosophy because convention itself has historically been so poorly understood. Vanderschraaf gives a new defense of this idea that integrates insights and arguments of past masters of moral and political philosophy together with recent analytical and empirical concepts and results from the social sciences. One of the substantial contributions of this work is a new account of convention that is sufficiently general for summarizing problems of justice, the social interactions where the interests of the agents involved diverge. Conventions are defined as equilibrium solutions to the games that summarize social interactions having a variety of possible stable resolutions and a corresponding plurality of equilibria.

Strategic Justice: Convention And Problems Of Balancing Divergent Interests 1st Table of contents:

1. Dilemmas of Interaction
Introduction
1.1. Five Motivating Problems
1.2. Noncooperative Game Theory
1.3. Revisiting the Motivating Problems
Conclusion
2. Coordination, Conflict, and Convention
Introduction
2.1. A Sampling of Earlier Discussions of Convention
2.2. The Arbitrariness of Conventions
2.3. Convention and Correlated Equilibrium
2.4. Defining Convention
Conclusion
3. The Circumstances of Justice
Introduction
3.1. The Standard Account
3.2. The Standard Account Meets Leviathan
3.3. The Standard Account Meets Hume’s Account
3.4. Playing Instruments and Hunting Stags
3.5. An Alternative Account
Conclusion
4. The Dynamics of Anarchy
Introduction
4.1. Two Accounts of Anarchy
4.2. Hybrid A Priori Models of Anarchy
4.3. A Dynamical Model of Anarchy
Conclusion
5. Playing Fair
Introduction
5.1. Fair Division
5.2. Costly Punishment and Joint Cooperation
Conclusion
6. A Limited Leviathan
Introduction
6.1. Two Problems
6.2. Hobbes’ Attempt to Justify Commonwealth
6.3. A Governing Convention
6.4. Democracy via Salience
Conclusion
7. The Foole, the Shepherd, and the Knave
Introduction
7.1. The Reconciliation Project and the Foole’s Challenge
7.2. Glaucon and Adeimantus’ Challenge
7.3. Hobbes’ Response to the Foole Interpreted as a Folk Theorem Response
7.4. An Invisible Foole
7.5. Combining the Social-Sanctions and the Inseparable-Goods Approaches
Conclusion
8. Justice as Mutual Advantage?
Introduction
8.1. Necessary Conditions for Justice as Mutual Advantage
8.2. The Vulnerability Objection
8.3. Three Unsatisfactory Responses
8.4. The Indefinitely Repeated Provider-Recipient Game
8.5. Setting the Boundaries
8.6. Too Many Equilibria?

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