The Disappearance of the Soul and the Turn against Metaphysics: Austrian Philosophy 1874-1918 (The Oxford History of Philosophy) Mark Textor

The Disappearance of the Soul and the Turn against Metaphysics: Austrian Philosophy 1874-1918 (The Oxford History of Philosophy) – Ebook Instant Download/Delivery ISBN(s): 9780198769828,0198769822

Product details:

• ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 0198769822
• ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-0198769828
• Author(s): Mark Textor

In the twentieth century English-language philosophy came to be science- and logic-oriented, and was suspicious of metaphysics. The Disappearance of the Soul and the Turn against Metaphysics traces our present philosophical outlook back to debates in Austro-German philosophy about the relation between empirical science and metaphysics: does empirical psychology depend on the metaphysics of the soul, the mental substance? The negative answer – that there is ‘a psychology without a soul’ – shaped Austrian philosophy and provided a model for ontologies that dispense with substances. Mark Textor tells the story of how and why (Austrian) philosophy turned against metaphysics . He introduces the key thinkers of the time, including the ‘fathers of Austrian philosophy’ Franz Brentano and Ernst Mach, whose Intentionalism (Brentano) and Neutral Monism (Mach) became distinctive and influential positions in the philosophy of mind. Textor goes on to use the ‘psychology without a soul’ view as a vantage point from which to reconstruct and assess the immediate pre-history and formation of analytic philosophy (Ward, Stout, Moore, Russell).

Table contents:

1. Soul-Searching in Central Europe
2. Austrian Philosophy and its Significance
3. Methodology: Rug Dealers and Eccentric Colleagues
Part I. The Evaporation of the Soul and Other Substances
1. Psychology, the Science of the Soul
1. Introduction
2. Herbart: Putting Metaphysics into Psychology
3. The Impossibility of Self-Observation and Metaphysical Psychology
4. Back to Parmenides: The Given and Herbart’s Eleatic Conception of Substance
5. The Neo-Soul Movement: The Herbartians and Lotze
6. The Soul and the Possibility of Psychology as an Independent Science
7. The Soul and the Unity of Consciousness
8. A False Lead: Composition via Substance
9. Active Attention and the Unity of Consciousness
10. From the Unity of the Attention Process to the Lotzean Soul
11. Looking Ahead: From the Unity of Consciousness to Cognition
2. ‘Psychology without a Soul’
1. Introduction: Hume and Lichtenberg: No Soul in Sight
2. Lange: Psychology as a Subject without an Object
3. Introducing Brentano
4. What is Psychology a Science of ? Brentano’s Answer
5. Brentano on Observing Mental Phenomena
6. Herbart’s (and Kant’s) ‘Great Error’
7. Wundt: No Mental Substance, but a Logical Subject
8. Introducing Mach
9. Mach I: The Ego Must Be Given up!
10. Mach II: Practical Unity and the Picture Theory
11. Lotze Responds to the Empiricists: The Soul IS Observable
12. Can Sensations Be Prior to the Ego? Lotze versus Mach
3. From Substance and Accident to Complex and Element
1. Introduction
2. Lotze and Stumpf against Substance
3. Avenarius and Mach against Substance
4. Persistence: Laws Squeeze out Substances
5. Mach against the Appearance/Reality Distinction
6. Is Antimetaphysics Self-Undermining?
7. From Properties to Elements
8. Can the Same Element Be Part of Different Complexes?
9. Objects Perceived by Different Individuals: Schlick against Mach
10. Summary
Part II. Managing without the Soul: Intentionality, Dualism, and Neutral Monism
4. The Mental and the Physical, Only a Matter of Perspective
1. Introduction
2. Fechner, the Pioneer of Neutral Monism
3. Neutral Monism_ Main Theme and Problems
4. Mach: Dual Dependence and Neutrality
5. Wundt: Two Standpoints or Neutral Monism with a Subject
6. Lipps: Neutral Monism and the Will
7. Riehl: Neo-Kantian Neutral Monism
8. Preview
5. The Mental and the Physical, an Intrinsic Distinction
1. Introduction
2. Another Way down: Brentano’s Concept-Empiricism
3. Clarifying ‘Mental Phenomenon’ and ‘Physical Phenomenon’
4. The Basics of the Aristotelian-Scholastic View of the Mind
5. The Fundamentality of Intentionality
6. Akt/Inhalt/Object: The Tripartite Distinction
7. Diaphaneity AKA Wahrnehmungsflüchtigkeit in Austro-German Philosophy
8. Diaphaneity and the Spectre of Neutral Monism
6. The Intentionality Challenge
1. Introduction
2. The Intentionality of Sensation
3. The Intentionality of Thought
4. Preview
Part III. From Psychology without a Soul to Psychology with a Self and beyond: The Anglo-Austro-German Axis 1886–1918
7. Cambridge Psychology between Lotze and Brentano
1. Ward: Psychology with a Subject, but without an Object/Content Distinction
2. Stout: Psychology without a Subject, but with an Act/Content/Object Distinction
8. The Rise and Fall of the Subject: A Case Study
1. Introduction: The Fundamental Role of the Subject
2. Russell 1911–13: Saving the Subject from the Neutral Monists
3. Russell 1913: Making the Subject Intelligible and the Unity of Experience
4. Russell 1918: Persistent Persons and Momentary Subjects
9. Act/Content/Object, Act/Object, or Just Object?
1. Introduction: Four Positions
2. Background: Idealism and Intentionality
3. Against the Content/Object Distinction
4. The Debate about the Act/Object Distinction
5. Conclusion of Part III
Part IV. Intuition, Metaphysics, and the Limits of Knowledge
10. Brentano’s One-Term View of Judgement
1. Introduction
2. The Two-Term Dogma
3. Brentano’s Empiricism at Work
4. Brentano’s Argument from Perception
5. Brentano against the Two-Term Prejudice
6. Summary
11. Judgement in the Service of the Will: Mach and Jerusalem
1. Mach: Memory, Judgement, and Well-Being
2. Jerusalem’s Urteilsfunktion
3. Jerusalem’s Circularity Argument against Brentano’s Judgement Primitivism
4. The Token Complexity Thesis and the Linguistic Articulation Argument
5. The Argument from the Function of Judgement
6. A Response to the Argument from the Function of Judgement
12. The Nature of Knowledge: Avenarius and Schlick
1. Introduction
2. Riehl’s Criticism + Avenarius’ Economy Theory = Schlick’s Erkenntnislehre
3. Avenarius and Schlick: ‘Cognition is Re-Cognition’
4. Scientific Knowledge, Cognitive Sloth, and Theoretical Economy
5. Cognitive Economy and Intellectual Hedonism
6. Mundane Knowledge and General Presentations
7. Scientific Knowledge and Concepts
8. Scientific Concepts and Implicit Definition
9. The Concept of Existence and Necessary Ignorance
10. Schlick versus Brentano
13. Drawing the Limits of Knowledge
1. Introduction
2. Metaphysics and Intuitive Knowledge
3. Intuition as the Source of Metaphysical Knowledge
4. Schlick against Intuitive Knowledge
14. Beyond the Limits of Knowledge: Intuition and Value
1. Introduction
2. The Drive to Perceive and Sensory Pleasure
3. The Theoretical versus the Practical Standpoint
4. Non-Conceptual Evaluation and Life
5. Schlick and Schopenhauer on Acquaintance as Immersion
6. Conclusion
References
Index

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